The Optimism Foundation is proposing a significant change to how Security Council members are selected. Under a ratification proposal dated October 22, the elected Council Lead would nominate members who take their seats unless tokenholders assemble sufficient voting power to block them, replacing the current system of direct cohort elections.
The Council Lead would be responsible for recruiting, interviewing, and nominating participants who carry out protocol upgrades and respond to security emergencies. The Token House, Optimism's tokenholder governance body, would retain the right to veto each nominee and remove the Lead from office.
How the Nomination Process Would Work
Under the proposed process, the Lead would put forward each nominee separately. Each candidate would receive one week for review, followed by one week for veto voting. To block an appointment, opponents would need to assemble 20% of active votable OP supply. If a veto reaches this threshold, the Lead would have to nominate a replacement through a new proposal.
The Foundation frames the shift as addressing recruitment challenges. It states that too few candidates self-nominate, strong candidates may avoid campaigning, and delegates lack sufficient means to conduct thorough candidate reviews and interviews.
Composition and Independence Requirements
The proposed Member Selection Criteria would constrain both individual candidates and the Council's overall composition. At least half of the participants would have to come from outside Optimism Core Development teams, and no more than one participant could be directly associated with a single entity. Association includes ownership, employment, contracting, and affiliation.
Geographic distribution requirements mandate that the number of participants residing in any one country remain below the quorum needed for multisig action. The Lead could not nominate someone associated with the Lead or someone with whom the Lead had an undisclosed conflict.
Public nomination statements would include verifiable qualifications, specific conflict disclosures, and confirmation that Foundation screening was completed. The Lead would also have to publish information about the selection process, including application and interview counts, and respond to delegate questions during review.
Tokenholder Oversight Mechanisms
Tokenholders would retain multiple oversight routes. They could organize a veto to block individual nominees before they assume their seats. Additionally, a Representative Removal proposal could remove the Lead and trigger a new election, requiring the ordinary 30% quorum measured against active votable supply and 51% approval among votes.
As of October 25, the linked rewrite was marked as Draft, while the main-branch Operating Manual remained at version 2.0.0. Ratification would precede a Lead election, with changes taking effect at that election. Existing signers would remain until their replacements were confirmed.
