Researchers have published a comprehensive security analysis of SHRINCS, a proposed post-quantum signature scheme designed for Bitcoin. The 131-page analysis, dated November 18, was announced by researcher Mikhail Kudinov and aims to reduce SHRINCS' security properties to its underlying hash function.
The analysis estimates classical security of 121.4 to 122.7 bits for SHRINCS, though these figures depend on three unproven conjectures. The research team notes the work remains incomplete, with ongoing efforts to analyze a property called SM-DSPR and to tighten security bounds.
How SHRINCS Works
SHRINCS is a hash-based signature scheme that relies on hash functions rather than the elliptic curve mathematics underlying current Bitcoin signatures. It combines two designs under one key: a stateful component built on FXMSS with WOTS+C, and a stateless fallback built on SLH-DSA.
The primary trade-off involves signature size. Stateful SHRINCS signatures range from 548 to 4,619 bytes, while the stateless fallback reaches 5,777 bytes. By comparison, current Schnorr signatures on Bitcoin are 64 bytes and ECDSA signatures typically measure around 71 bytes. Larger signatures consume more block space, reducing the number of transactions that can fit in each block.
Security and Operational Risks
The stateful signature path carries a critical security risk. It depends on one-time keys, and accidental key reuse could allow an attacker to forge signatures and steal funds. Wallet software must therefore track the state of every key precisely. The stateless path avoids this vulnerability but at significantly larger signature sizes.
Jonas Nick, Blockstream's director of research, emphasized that wallets must automatically fall back to the stateless path whenever a state counter could be compromised. He also warned that widespread adoption of larger signatures would affect the network's capacity. The increased signature size would reduce transactions per block and potentially alter Bitcoin's value proposition.
Call for Community Review
The researchers acknowledge that the analysis requires thorough peer review. The project's GitHub repository warns that the documents may contain errors and should not be the sole basis for deploying SHRINCS. The team has asked the community to identify any flaws in their work.
The researchers also produced two additional results applicable beyond SHRINCS: a classical bound for a property called ITSR without reprogramming, and a quadratic quantum bound for undetectability. These findings apply to SPHINCS+ and SLH-DSA, the hash-based schemes from which SHRINCS borrows.
The draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal for SHRINCS is open for comment, with researchers seeking feedback from engineers, cryptographers, and protocol developers.


